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OAK PARK FEDERAL SA VINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
v. VILLAGE OF OAK PARK: THE FOUNDATION BEGINS
TO CRUMBLE ON HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

As urbanization has accelerated, the need for local selfgovernment has become increasingly evident.' Home rule2 is
a viable means to obtain the local autonomy required to efficiently cope with problems peculiar to municipal and county
government. Home rule eliminates, to some extent, the state
legislature's control over municipal governments 3 and gives the
home rule unit full power of self-government regarding subjects
1 See REC. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Comm. of Loc. Gov't Maj.
Prop., Vol. VII at 1605 (1969-70), where it was stated:
The fundamental reason for favoring home rule over the existing
system of legislative supremacy is this: Local governments must be
authorized to exercise broad powers and to undertake creative and extensive projects if they are to contribute effectively to solving the immense problems that have been created by the increasing urbanization
of our society. (emphasis in original).
2 Though home rule is a new concept in Illinois law, it originated well
before the founding of our nation. This fact was noted in People ex rel.
Metropolitan St. Ry. v. St. Bd. of Tax Commissioners, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E.
69 70-71 (1905), where the court stated:
The principle of home rule, or the right of self-government as to local
affairs, existed before we had a constitution. Even prior to the Magna
Charta, some cities, boroughs, and towns had various customs and liberties, which had been granted by the crown, or had subsisted through
long user, [sic] and among them was the right to elect certain local officers from their own citizens, and, with some restrictions, to manage their
own purely local affairs. These customs and liberties, with other rights,
had been so often trampled upon by the King as to arouse deep hatred
of centralization of power; and we find among the many grants of the
Great Charter that 'the city of London shall have all its ancient liberties and its free customs as well by land as by water. Furthermore, we
will and grant that all other cities and boroughs and towns . . . shall
have all their liberties and free customs.'
The use of home rule in the United States dates from the Missouri Constitution of 1875 which provided for the separation of the City and County
of St. Louis, allowing the city to adopt its own charter by popular vote.
Similar provisions were made for all other cities in the state with populations
of 100,000 or more.
3 Under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, local governments were regarded
as creatures of the state, and thus, capable of exercising only those powers
granted to them by the General Assembly. This dependent status has been
defined by a passage from Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal corporations
which has come to be known as "Dillon's Rule" and reads as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily
or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply convenient but indispensable.
1 DILLON,

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs

448 (5th ed. 1911) (emphasis in original).
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solely of municipal concern. 4 With this in mind, the framers of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution drafted article VII section 6,5 a
provision intended to be one of the broadest home rule grants in
the nation.6
A home rule unit derives its powers from either the state
4 See note 1 supra at 1605-06 where it was stated:
[L]ocal government should be strengthened because it is closer to the
people it serves than are other forms of government and, as a result,
on balance is likely to be more responsible to the citizenry, more sensitive to community needs and more efficient and effective in meeting those
needs. In addition, broadening the powers of local governments will
reduce the number of bills dealing with local matters which now overburden the General Assembly, will strengthen the role of local officials
in determining local issues and diminish the power of state legislators
who are less familiar with local conditions, and reduce the amount of
state control over local affairs. (emphasis in original).

ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1970) reads as follows:
(a)
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the
electors of the county and any municipality which has a population of
more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may elect
by referendum to become home rule units. Except as limited by this
Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any
function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
5

(e)
A home rule unit shall have only the power that the General
Assembly may provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment for more
than six months or (2) to license for revenue or impose taxes upon or
measured by income or earnings or upon occupations.
(g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of
three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the
power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not
exercised or performed by the State other than a power or function
specified in subsection (1) of this Section.
(h)
The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the
exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule
unit other than a taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this Section.
(1) The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of
home rule units (1) to make local improvements by special assessment
and to exercise this power jointly with other counties and municipalities,
and other classes of units of local government having that power on the
effective date of this Constitution unless that power is subsequently denied by law to any such other units of local government or (2) to levy
or impose additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries in the
manner provided by law for the provision of special services to those
areas and for the payment of debt incurred in order to provide those
special services.
(m)
Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed
liberally.
6 See note 1 supra at 1600 where the Committee on Local Government
stated:
Paragraph 3.1(a) [now 6(a)] grants very broad powers of local selfgovernment to specified counties and municipalities. . . . It should be
understood that the system proposed by the committee differs in many
respects from the various home rule systems adopted in other states. The
differences have been suggested by the unique needs of Illinois government.
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constitution 7 or from home rule legislation enacted by the state's
legislative body. s Generally, constitutional provisions are considered self-executing,9 requiring no legislation to make them
effective, however, those provisions which plainly indicate that
the subject matter requires enabling legislation, are not so conThe extent to which the Illinois home rule provision
sidered.'
is self-executing came squarely before the Illinois Supreme Court
in Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan Association, et al. v.
Village of Oak Park."
THE OAK PARK DECISION

Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Circuit Court of Cook
County seeking a declaratory judgment that a series of ordinances creating a special service area," adopted by the village
pursuant to home rule powers, were unconstitutional and void.
The circuit court found the ordinances to be constitutional and
sustained the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings."
Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, "[A] home rule unit
may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to
its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the
Further, "[Tjhe Genpower .. .to tax; and to incur debt."',
eral Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home rule
units . . . (2) to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within
their boundaries in the manner provided by law for the provision

of special services to those areas

....

"15

This latter provision

furnished plaintiffs' principal contention on appeal: absent enaConstitutional home rule exists in thirty states, viz.: ALAS. CONST.
art. X, §§ 9, 10; ARiz. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 2, 3; CAL. CONST. art.
XI, §§ 6 et seq.; COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1-6; FLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 11;
GA. CONST. art. XV; HAWAII CONST. art. VII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XII,
§ 2; LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (a); MD. CONST. art. XIV; MICH. CONST. art.
VIII, §§ 2 et seq.; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 36; Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 18;
MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. XI, H§ 2-5; NEV. CONST. art.
VIII, § 8; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 9, 11-13; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII; OKLA.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2-7; ORE. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 2a; PENN. CONST. art.
XV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XVIII; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9; TEx. CONST.
art. XI § 5; UTAH CONST. art. XI § 5; WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10,
11; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39(a); Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3; WYO. CONST.
art. XIII, § 1 and ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
8 Statutory home rule exists in New Jersey by virtue of R.S. 40, 42,
et seq. N.J.S.A.
9 People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880) ; State ex rel. Voss v. Davis,
418 S.W.2d 163, 166 (S.Ct. Mo., 1967) ; and Cassidy v. Ohio Public Service
Co., 78 Ohio App. 221, 69 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1946). See also note 1 supra
at 1616 where it was stated:
Paragraph 3.1 grants extensive powers directly to the specified counties
and municipalities. The powers exist without further action of either
the General Assembly or the local governments that receive the powers.
10 People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880).
11 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
12 Id. at 202, 296 N.E.2d at 346.
13 Id.
at 201, 296 N.E.2d at 346.
14 ILL. CONST. art.

VII, § 6(a) (1970).
§ 6(l) (1970)

15 ILL. CONST. art. VII,

(emphasis added).
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bling legislation adopted by the General Assembly, a home rule
unit may not create a special service area or impose taxes or
6
issue bonds to provide special services.'
Plaintiffs contended that the wording of subsection 6(1)
was in the nature of a condition precedent and that until the
General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with the special
service concept, a home rule unit was without authority to create
such an entity.1 7 In rebuttal, the defendant maintained that inasmuch as the "powers and functions of home rule units shall
be construed liberally, ' ' 8 subsection 6 (1) must be interpreted as
being self-executing. ' ' It was also argued that compliance with
the Revenue Act of 193920 satisfied the provision's mandate that
'2 1
all actions thereunder be "in the manner provided by law. "
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument by noting there is an inherent conflict between the introductory phrase of subsection 6 (1) and the specific language of subsection 6(l) (2).
In order to resolve the conflict Mr. Justice
Ryan observed:
[I]t is incumbent upon the court to give meaning to every section
and clause of the instrument. If different parts of the constitution appear to be in conflict, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must favor a construction which will render every
word operative rather than one which will make some words idle
and nugatory. . . . One clause will not be allowed to defeat another if by any22 reasonable construction the. two can be made to
stand together.
The majority of the court was of the opinion that to construe
subsection 6 (1) (2) as self-executing would render the words "in
2
the manner provided by law" meaningless. 3
It was the court's impression that the words "in the manner
provided by law" did not refer to the Revenue Act of 1939 as
the defendant had contended, but rather, envisioned specific enabling legislation.24 The majority noted that inasmuch as the
Revenue Act of 1939 was enacted pursuant to the mandate of
1' 54 Ill. 2d at 203, 296 N.E.2d at 346-47.
17 Brief for appellant OAK PARK FEDERAL

SAVINGS

AND

LOAN

Asso-

at 18-19, Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Village
of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
18 ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(m) (1970).
19 Brief for appellee VILLAGE OF OAK PARK at 18, Oak Park Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296
CIATION

N.E.2d 344 (1973).
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 482 et seq. (1971).

Note 19 supra at 12.
54 Ill. 2d at 203; 296 N.E.2d at 347.
Mr. Justice Ryan supported his observation by citing 1 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 128-29, and 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 4705 (3d ed. 1943).
22

22

23 54 Ill. 2d at 203-04, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
24 Id. at 204, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
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the 1870 Illinois Constitution,, it required a uniform tax rate
for each taxing district. 2 Thus, the court was of the opinion
that:
[W]ithout further enabling legislation, the taxes levied by these
ordinances are required to be extended against all the property
of the taxing district, which in this instance is the Village of Oak
Park. The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1939 do not attempt
to establish the statutory
framework within which section 6 (1) (2)
27
can be implemented.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
The majority in Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan invited
not only a severe chastisement by the three justices who
chose to dissent from the court's decision,2' - but the majority also
appears to have disregarded several other principles of constitutional construction, viz., to give effect to the intent of the people
adopting the constitution and to view the whole instrument with
the purpose of arriving at the true intention of each part.2 9 The
question is why.
Intent of the People Governs
Of the many arguments propounded by those who favor
literal construction of constitutional provisions, the most frequently resorted to may be summarized as follows:
[T]he constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to
be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that
they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words
employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument 30in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed.
This principle was discussed in Hills v. City of Ch icago31 and
Beardstown v. Virginia32 the leading Illinois cases on this subject.
In Hills the appellant challenged an order of the Superior
Court of Cook County directing the sale of certain parcels of his
property for the non-payment of special assessment taxes. He
maintained that inasmuch as the city collector had no constitutional right to receive state and county taxes, the collector lacked
25

ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1870).

54 Ill. 2d at 204, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
27 Id. at 205, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
28 Id. at 205-09, 296 N.E.2d at 348-50.
29 See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 123-33 (8th ed. 1927).
30 Id. at 143. See also People ex rel. Watseka Telephone v. Emmerson,
302 Ill. 300 at 303-04, 134 N.E. 707 at 709 (1922).
31 60 Ill. 86 (1871).
3276 111. 34 (1875).
26
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authority to seek the challenged order.33 To make a final determination of this issue, the court found it necessary to interpret the
constitutional provision relied upon by the appellant. In doing
so, the court noted:
[T]he doctrine is firmly established, that where the words employed, when taken in their ordinary, natural signification, and the
order of their grammatical arrangement given them by the framers,
embody a definite meaning which involves no conflict with other
parts of the same instrument, then that meaning which is apparent upon the face of the instrument is the only one we are at liberty to say was
intended to be conveyed, and there is no room for
3 4
construction.

Beardstown was a suit in chancery to contest the outcome
of an election on the question of the removal of the county seat
to the City of Virginia. The appellant contended that the franchise had unconstitutionally been denied to a certain class of
voters, namely, persons of foreign birth who were not naturalized
citizens but were, on April 1, 1848, minors and inhabitants of the
state.15 The court held that inasmuch as these individuals were
not qualified voters under the Constitution of 1848,36 it was clear
no interpretation of the 1870 Constitution would entitle them to
3
that rightY.
Discussing interpretation of the latter document,
the court stated:
It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpre33 60 Ill. at 89. Appellant relied on ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1870)
which read as follows:

The general assembly shall provide, in all cases where it may be
necessary to sell real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments for State, county, municipal or other purposes, that a return
of such unpaid taxes or assessments shall be made to some general
officer of the county having authority to receive State and county taxes,
and there shall be no sale of the said property for any of said taxes
or assessments but by said officer, upon the order or judgment of some
court of record.
4 Id. at 90. See Hamer v. Board of Education, 47 Ill. 2d 480, 265
N.E.2d 666 (1970) ; Graham v. Dye, 308 Ill. 283, 139 N.E. 390 (1923);
Chicago Home for Girls v. Carr, 300 Ill. 478, 133 N.E. 344 (1921) ; Downs
v. Curry, 296 Ill. 277, 129 N.E. 761 (1921); Colton v. Trustees of Pension
Fund, 287 111. 56, 122 N.E. 73 (1919) ; People v. Stevenson, 281 Ill. 17,
117 N.E. 747 (1917) ; Gar Creek Drainage Dist. v. Wagner, 256 Ill. 338,
100 N.E. 190 (1912); Crane v. C.&W.I.R.R., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N.E. 222
(1908) (Dunn J., dissenting); Chudnovsky v. Eckles, 232 Ill. 312, 83 N.E.
846 (1908) ; Miller v. People, 230 Ill. 65, 82 N.E. 521 (1907) ; City of
Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367, 59 N.E. 791 (1901) ; and O'Connor v.
Leddy, 64 Il1. 299 (1872).
3., 76 Ill. at 39-40.
311

ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1848) provided:

In all elections, every white male citizen above the age of 21 years,
having resided in the state one year next preceding any election, shall
be entitled to vote at such election; and every white male inhabitant of
the age aforesaid, who may be a resident of the state at the time of the
adoption of this constitution, shall have the right of voting as aforesaid;
but no such citizen or inhabitant shall be entitled to vote, except in the
district or county in which he shall actually reside at the time of such
election.
31 76 Ill. at 43.
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tation, and when the words have a definite and precise meaning,
to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.As

The Supreme Court of the United States cited both Hills
and Beardstown as precedent for its determination of the constructional issue presented in Lake County v. Rollins.,9 The case
involved the construction of a debt limitation provision of the
Colorado Constitution of 1876 ;10 the Supreme Court being asked
to determine whether a county could issue warrants for its
ordinary expenses such as "witnesses' and jurors' fees, election
costs, charges for the board of prisoners, and county treasurers'
commissions, etc. '41 The appellee, Rollins, asserted that the
challenged provision prohibited counties from contracting debt
by loan in any manner except for the purposes therein provided,
viz., erection of necessary public buildings and making or repairing public roads and bridges. Further, he contended that the
challenged tax warrants were void for the reason that they exceeded the limitation placed upon the county's power to contract
42
debt.
Holding the provision in question applied to indebtedness
for all purposes and not just those enumerated and that the
county had not yet exceeded its debt limit, the Court remarked:
Why not assume that the framers of the constitution and the people
who voted it into existence, meant exactly what it says? At the
first glance, its reading produces no impression of doubt as to the
meaning. It seems all sufficiently plain; and in such case there is
a well-settled rule which we must observe. The object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent
38 Id. at 40.
39 130 U.S. 662 (1888).
40

COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1876) provided:

No county shall contract any debt by loan in any form, except for
the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, making or repairing
public roads and bridges; and such indebtedness contracted in any one
year shall not exceed the rates upon the taxable property in such county
following, to wit: counties in which the assessed valuation of taxable
property shall exceed five millions of dollars, one dollar and fifty cents
on each thousand dollars thereof; counties in which such valuation shall
be less than five millions of dollars, three dollars on each thousand dollars thereof; and the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county,
for all purposes, exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of the
constitution, shall not at any time exceed twice the amount above herein
limited, unless when, in manner provided by law, the question of increasing such debt shall, at a general election, be submitted to such of
the qualified electors of such county as in the year last preceding such
election shall have paid a tax upon property assessed to them in such
county, and a majority of those voting thereon shall vote in favor of
increasing the debt: but the bonds, if any be issued therefor, shall not
run less than ten years; and the aggregate amount of debt so contracted
shall not at any time exceed twice the rate upon the valuation last
herein mentioned: Provided, That this section shall not apply to counties having a valuation of less than one million of dollars.
41139 U.S. at 662.
42

Id. at 665.
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of the framers, and of the people in adopting it.

This intent is

to be found in the instrument itself; and when the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are43 not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument.
Accordingly, when "construing constitutional provisions the
true inquiry should be, what was the understanding of the meaning of the words used by the voters who adopted it?"44 Clearly,
a court may best achieve such an "understanding of meaning" if
it does not look for dark or abstrusive meanings in the words
employed, but applies the words in their ordinary, natural signification and in the order of their grammatical arrangement. Further, the court must not interpret that which has no need of
interpretation or otherwise alter or restrict what is a definite and
precise meaning of the words employed.
Construction of the phrase "in the manner provided by law"
in accordance with the above principles raises doubt as to the
correctness of the court's decision in Oak Park Federal Savings
and Loan. The generally accepted meaning of the word "manner"
is "a way or method of doing something; way in which something
is done or happens, mode or fashion of procedure. ' 45 "Provided"
is the past participle of the verb "provide" which is defined as
"to make available; supply; afford. '46 "Law" is defined as "all
the rules of conduct established and enforced by the authority,
legislation, or custom of a given community or other group.
. "".
"4 Hence, it must be inferred that the voters who ratified
the 1970 Illinois Constitution understood "in the manner provided by law" to mean "in a mode made available by the General
Assembly," or something very similar.
Thus, the court appears to have erred when it determined
that the framers' inclusion of the phrase in question was a visualization of enabling legislation. Further, it is inescapable that
by its holding, the court has, in effect, amended the phrase to
read "in the manner to be provided by law."
Id. at 670. See the Court's statement on page 671 to the effect that:
There is even stronger reason for adhering to this rule in the case
of a constitution than in that of a statute, since the latter is passed by
a deliberative body of small numbers, a large proportion of whose members are more or less conversant with the niceties of construction and
discrimination and fuller opportunity exists for attention and revision
of such a character, while constitutions, although framed by conventions,
are yet created by the votes of the entire body of electors in a state,
the most of whom are little disposed, even if they were able, to engage
in such refinements. The simplest and most obvious interpretation of a
constitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely to be that meant by
the people in its adoption.
44 Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 344, 70 N.E. 327, 331 (1904).
C5 Webster's New World Dictionary 893 (College ed. 1966).
at 1172.
46 Id.
17 Id. at 828.
43
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The Whole Instrument To Be Examined
In Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan, the supreme court
correctly noted that:
[I]t is incumbent upon the court to give meaning to every section
and clause of the instrument. If different parts of the constitution
appear to be in conflict, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must favor a construction which will render every
word operative
rather than one which will make some words idle
4
and nugatory. 8
However, the court's application of the rule to the facts before
it in Oak Park is subject to question.
Professor Cooley has stated, "[A-1 clause which, standing by
itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made plain by
4
comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law. 11
For that reason he concluded, "[T Ihe whole instrument is to be
examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each
part." 0 The Illinois Supreme Court applied this canon of construction in People ex rel. McDavid v. Barrett,' Wulff v. Al53
drich52 and Hirschfield v. Barrett.
In People ex rel. McDavid v. Barrett4 the Auditor of Public Accounts and the State Treasurer appealed from judgments
of the Circuit Court of Cook County awarding a writ of mandamus compelling the Auditor to issue warrants for, and the Treasurer to pay, the amounts legislatively appropriated to the relators - all widows of deceased circuit court judges.55 The
appellants contended that the appropriations were unconstitutional because they violated the constitutional prohibition against
granting extra compensation to any public officer, agent, servant
or contractor, after service has been rendered or contract made.50
Holding that the challenged appropriation did not fall within
the confines of the prohibition upon which the appellants relied,
the court stated:
It is a well-recognized canon of constitutional construction that the
chief purpose sought to be attained is the intention of its framers.
In seeking such an intention courts are to consider the language
used, the object to be attained or the evil to be remedied ...
In the construction of the constitution courts should not indulge
in speculation apart from the spirit of the document, or apply so
strict a construction as to exclude its real object and intent.57
41 54 Ill. 2d at 203, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
49 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

50 Id.
51 370 II. 478, 19 N.E.2d 356 (1939).

127 (8th ed. 1927).

52 124 111. 591, 16 N.E. 886 (1888).
53 40 Ill. 2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 831 (1968).
54370 Ill. 478, 19 N.E.2d 356 (1939).
5 Id. at 479, 19 N.E.2d at 358.
56 Id. at 480, 19 N.E.2d at 358.
5 Id. See also Scott v. Freeport Motor Casualty Co., 379 Ill. 155, 39
N.E.2d 999 (1943) ; Elgin Storage and Transfer Co. v. Pirrine, 2 Il. 2d 28,
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The appellee in Wulff v. Aldrich,' obtained a writ of mandamus compelling the defendant, Wulff, to draw a warrant on the
County Treasurer of Cook County for the amount of an allowance made to him by the Board of County Commissioners.5 9 The
appellant Wulff's refusal to draw the warrant in question was
based upon his understanding that the appellee's compensation
was fixed by statute. 60 However, the appellee maintained that
the statute in question was in direct conflict with the 1870 Illinois
Constitution inasmuch as the constitution provided that the
"county board . . . shall fix the compensation of all county officers." 61
The Illinois Supreme Court, adopting the opinion of the
circuit court in full, was of the belief that reference to the proceedings of a constitutional convention may be beneficial to a reviewing court. This was evidenced by its statement that:
References to the proceedings of a constitutional convention are
sometimes resorted to by the courts in order to find reasons for a
particular action of the convention. They are not resorted to for
the purpose of construing away any express language of the constitution, or even for the purpose of construing what may be
doubtful. 'When the inquiry is directed,' says Judge COOLEY, 'to
ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied or the purpose
sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be
proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed
the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the pur6 2
pose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory.'
The appellants in Hirschfield v. Barrett63 sought an injunction to compel the defendant to count and report the write-in
votes received by Michael M. Phillips, also a plaintiff, for the
office of associate judge of Cook County, allegedly vacated by the
death of Associate Judge H.R. Stoffels. 64 The defendants maintained that they were precluded from holding a formal election
to fill the alleged vacancy by the Attrition Statute.6 5 However,
the appellants contended that the statute relied upon by the appellee was repugnant to the mandate of the Judicial Article of
the 1870 Illinois Constitution. 6 Affirming the lower court's denial of the injunction, the supreme court remarked:
116 N.E.2d 868 (1954) ; and People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 242
N.E.2d 267 (1968).
58 124 Ill. 591, 16 N.E. 886 (1888).
59 Id. at 592-93, 16 N.E. at 886-87.
60 Id. at 592, 16 N.E. at 886.
61 Id. at 593, 16 N.E. at 887.

62 Id. at 598, 16 N.E. at 891. See also, Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 456 (1854); Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421 (1884);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); and Kentucky Union Co. v.
Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140 (1911).
6 40 Ill. 2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 831 (1968).
64 Id. at 225, 239 N.E.2d at 832.
65

Id. at 226, 239 N.E.2d at 833.

66 Id. at 227, 239 N.E.2d at 833.
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In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Feinberg, 348 Ill.549,
566, we stated: 'The meaning of the constitution is not to be ascertained by giving too great weight to a single phrase, sentence or
section. Its several provisions are all parts of one instrument and
must be construed together, giving each its proper consideration.'
And in construing the same Judicial Article now at issue we have
said: 'We must read the amendment as a whole and attribute to
each part a meaning that is consistent and harmonious with the
amendment's overall intendment and purpose . . . . 6

It is clear that where a constitutional provision is of doubtful import, any ambiguity therein may be construed away by the
court's examination of the whole document with a design to
arriving at the intention of its framers in drafting each of its
parts. The court is not limited to a consideration of the language employed; but may also consider the object to be attained
or the evil to be remedied by the provision in question. To aid
in this task, references to the proceedings of the constitutional
convention may be beneficial to the extent that they enable the
court to familiarize itself with reasons for a particular action by
the convention. Finally, the provision must be read as a whole
and a meaning must be attributed to each part that is consistent
and harmonious with its overall intendment and purpose; not
giving too great weight to any single phrase, sentence or section.
A cursory perusal of the convention proceedings reveals the
primary purpose of the Home Rule Article - to give units of
local government the autonomy which they require to effectively
cope with the problems peculiar to municipal and county government.3 8 Furthermore, the object the delegates to the Constitutional Convention sought to attain by inclusion of the special
service concept appears to be "to halt or at least reduce the proliferation of new units of local special government in Illinois. ' '69
Equally noteworthy is that the majority proposal as related
to differential taxation and special assessment taxation was
originally submitted to the convention as a limitation on the selfexecuting powers of home rule units, 0 clearly requiring enabling
legislation. However, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Ward
.in his dissenting opinion:
When it became obvious that 6(e) (3) did not fulfill the drafters'
intent that enabling legislation was not to be required it was rejected, . .. Section 6 (1) was drafted. 7
Thus, it appears that the court has incorrectly applied the
67 Id.

at 228, 239 N.E.2d at 834.
68 See notes 1 and 4 supra.
69 Note 1 supra at 1664.
70 Note 1 supra, Comm. on Style, Drafting and Submission, Proposal
No. 15, vol. VII at 2560-61.
-154 Ill. 2d at 209, 296 N.E.2d at 349.
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canon of constitutional construction upon which it relied. It has
not only disregarded the objects the framers of the 1970 Constitution sought to attain, but has also rendered part of the document
inoperative. By concluding that "in the manner provided by law"
requires enabling legislation before there can be differential
taxation, the court has rendered the phrase "the General Assembly may not deny or limit" nugatory. For unless and until the
General Assembly passes enabling legislation establishing a system of real property classification, home rule units are powerless
to create special service areas within their boundaries.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Oak Park Federal
Savings and Loan Association, et al. v. Village of Oak Park will
adversely effect home rule units in several ways. It reimposes
upon municipalities and counties in Illinois a somewhat dependent status which has come to be known as "Dillon's Rule." To
that extent, the decision curtails the framers' attempt to make
units of local government autonomous bodies. Unfortunately, it
appears that the decision will promulgate the proliferation of new
units of local special government in Illinois, rather than halt or
slow their development. In effect, Oak Park will spawn a new
era of mosquito abatement districts.
Finally, it seems that the court has taken a backdoor approach to the construction of the Home Rule Article, for it has
allowed the General Assembly to do by inaction that which it may
not do by direct action; namely, deny or limit a home rule unit's
power to create special service areas and impose taxes for their
maintenance. There appears to be a single reason for the court's
adoption of this construction of the Home Rule Article: the supreme court is apprehensive about the growth of home rule in
Illinois.
Alan L. Fulkerson

